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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 1, 2004, in the early morning, two people were stabbed to death in Rigby, 
Idaho. A child in the house called 911 and reported an intruder had killed her mommy and her 
mommy's boyfriend. The description the child gave of the attacker was of a tall man, not how 
anyone would describe Shana Parkinson, a not-so-tall woman. Parkinson showed up at a hospital 
that same morning for cuts on her hands and was in a bewildered state of mind. She was arrested 
the same day for murder. 
The district court granted Parkinson's change of venue, but changed venue only from 
Jefferson County to Bonneville County. The news sources which tainted the jury pool in 
Jefferson County originated in Bonneville County: The Post Register, a daily newspaper in 
Bonneville County; KIFI News Channel 8 in Bonneville County; KIDK News Channel 3 in 
Bo1mevi!le County. 
In a screening voir dire process, four days before the start of the jury trial, the district 
court called in 128 potential jurors from Bonneville County. All 128 of them were questioned by 
the court and counsel but the potential jurors were not sworn to tell the truth. 
During trial, the state presented a "footprint expert," a high school graduate from Canada 
with law enforcement experience. His testimony was that a footprint at the scene of the crime 
matched one of the footprints made by Parkinson at the jail. The witness was told by the Court 
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in a pretrial ruling that his investigation was admissible, but not his conclusion. The witness 
violated the pretrial ruling under questioning from the prosecutor and gave his conclusion. The 
jury could have seen whether or not the footprints matched without the conclusion. 
Upon the state resting its case in chief, the prosecutor did not have the date in the 
information, a fatal error to the information. The judge assisted the prosecutor in saving the 
state's case, and ruled the prosecutor hadn't quite rested yet. The state was permitted to amend 
their information. 
The prosecutor gave improper closing arguments, as he told the jury he was humbled to 
represent the victims and their memory, and twice emphasized inadmissible testimony from a 
witness. 
Parkinson was convicted by the jury. The Court sentenced her to 27 years to life in 
prison. Neither a judgment nor a conviction appears in the record, but Parkinson is in prison. An 
appeal was filed. 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. When a change in venue has been granted due to pretrial publicity, should venue 
be changed to a county which has not heard the same publicity? 
2. When potential jurors answer questions in Court without being sworn to tell the 
truth, has fundamental error occurred? 
3. Did the prosecuting attorney and the state's "footprint expert" violate the pretrial 
order by providing inadmissible evidence? 
4. When the Prosecuting Attorney's Information does not contain a date the alleged 
crime happened, should the Information be dismissed upon the state resting its 
case? 
5. Is it proper for a prosecutor to argue in closing that he represents the victims and 
then emphasizes inadmissible evidence? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. WHEN A CHANGE IN VENUE HAS BEEN GRANTED DUE TO PRETRIAL 
PUBLICITY, VENUE SHOULD BE CHANGED TO A COUNTY WHICH HAS NOT 
HEARD THE SAME PUBLICITY. 
A motion to change venue was filed by Parkinson on June 25, 2004, together with some 
of the clippings of local media. (Record, page 97). The state indicated in writing it had no 
position on the matter (Record, page 130), but objected to the change of venue at oral argument. 
(Transcript, page 56-58). 
The District Court granted the motion to change venue, but only transferred venue from 
Jefferson County to Bonneville County. (Transcript, page 61-68). 
The media sources from which the court and counsel were concerned primarily originate 
in Bonneville County. The Post Register is published in Bonneville County, the area in which it 
has its primary circulation. KIFI News Channel 8 has its primary office in Bonneville County. 
KIDK News Channel 3 has its primary office in Bonneville County. 
The Court in State v. Hall, 111 Idaho 827 (App. 1986), stated: 
When a trial judge finds a reasonable likelihood that qualitative or quantitative 
elements of pretrial publicity have affected the impartiality of prospective jurors, 
the constitutional balance swings in favor of assuring a fair trial. "The trial comis 
must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against the 
accused." Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 at 362 (1966). The judge should 
continue the case until the impact of publicity abates or should transfer the case to 
another county where publicity has been less pervasive. Id. Idaho judges have 
authority, under Idaho Code Section 19-1801 and Rule 21, Idaho Criminal Rules, 
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to change venue in such situations. ( emphasis added). 
111 Idaho at 830. 
The Sheppard case quoted by the Idaho Court of Appeals was about Mr. Sheppard being 
accused of killing his wife. Some of the facts in Sheppard are similar to this Parkinson case, 
such as: 
The victim in Sheppard was bludgeoned to death, the victims in Parkinson were 
stabbed to death; 
Sheppard did not confess, Parkinson did not confess; 
Sheppard was accused of killing his wife because he had another love interest, 
Parkinson was accused of killing her former husband because he had another love 
interest; 
Sheppard can't remember where he was or what happened to him at all times of 
the night on the night of the murder, Parkinson can't remember where she was or 
what happened to her at all times of the night on the night of the murder; 
A child in the Sheppard home goes unharmed while a violent crime is happening 
in the next bedroom, a child in the Parkinson home goes unharmed while a violent 
crime is happening in the next bedroom; 
The Sheppard crime happened in a small town (Bay Village, Ohio) located next to 
a big town (Cleveland, Ohio), the Parkinson crime happened in a small Lown 
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(Rigby, Idaho) located next to a big town (Idaho Falls, Idaho); 
The trial judge in Sheppard gave a cautionary instruction concerning media 
coverage, the trial judge in Parkinson gave a cautionary instruction concerning 
media coverage; 
The media loved an intriguing story in the Sheppard case and provided detailed 
and extensive coverage, the media loved an intriguing story in the Parkinson case 
and provided detailed and extensive coverage. 
The United States Supreme Court, after reviewing all the facts and circumstances in 
Sheppard v. Maxwell, concluded as follows: 
Due Process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from 
outside influences. Given the pervasiveness of modern communications and the 
difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial 
courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed 
against the accused. And appellate tribunals have the duty to make an 
independent evaluation of the circumstances. Of course, there is nothing that 
proscribes the press from reporting events that transpire in the courtroom. But 
where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will 
prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue the case until the threat abates, or 
transfer it to another county not so permeated with publicity. 
384 U.S. at 362. 
The trial court in the present case concluded: "['ve looked at the coverage. I am 
concerned about the defendant's right to a fair trial." (Transcript, page 67). Publicity is more 
pervasive, not less pervasive, in Bonneville County than in Jefferson County. The court's 
reasoning to transfer it to a county where the individuals involved are not well known is not a 
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factor in considering a change of venue. (Transcript, page 67, 68). The focus is the publicity. not 
the relationships of those involved. The trial court's home and chambers are located in 
Bonneville County, and convenience of the trial judge is not a factor for a change in venue. 
The court erred in transferring the case to Bonneville County. The Due Process Clause of 
the Constitution of the United States, Amendment V, and the Due Process Clause of the 
Constitution of the State ofidaho, Article I, Section 13, was violated. 
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II. WHEN POTENTIAL JURORS ANSWER QUESTIONS IN COURT WITHOUT 
BEING SWORN TO TELL THE TRUTH, FUNDAMENTAL ERROR HAS 
OCCURRED. 
Four days prior to the start of the jury trial, the district court summoned some l 28 people 
to the Bonneville County Courthouse. The purpose was to pre-screen individuals for jury 
selection. (Record, page 498 to 501; Transcript, page 533 to 943). The trial court directed the 
jury commissioner to identify certain questions in a questionnaire (the questionnaire is not part of 
the Record or the Transcript) and notify the judge if anyone had a problem, then they would 
come into the courtroom. (Transcript, page 533). 
One hundred twenty eight people appeared in Court for this screening process and 
answered questions. Not one was sworn to tell the truth. Forty four potential jurors were 
excused and the other 84 showed up four days later for jury selection. The 84 potential jurors 
who made it past the pre-screening process were joined by 58 others, because a total of 142 
potential jurors showed up for the jury trial. The 58 potential jurors who didn't show up for the 
pre-screening but showed up for the jury trial with the other 84 must have made it past the jury 
commissioners "problem" areas (I'm not sure about that, but I'm pretty sure no one else knows 
what that was all about because we don't get any help from the record or the transcript). 
When potential jurors are summoned to court, they are required to fill out a questionnaire. 
The questionnaire provides simple questions but "shall contain the prospective juror's 
declaration that his responses are true to the best of his knowledge and his acknowledgment that 
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a willful misrepresentation of a material fact may be punished as a misdemeanor." Idaho Code 
Section 2-208(1). Bonneville County's Juror Questi01111aire concludes: 
The responses to the questions on this qualification form are true to the best of my 
knowledge. I acknowledge that a willful misrepresentation of a material fact may 
be punishable by a fine of not more than three hundred dollars ($300.00) or by 
imprisonment in the county jail for not more than ten (10) days or both. 
A jury commissioner, when requested by the court, can excuse a potential juror if the 
potential juror is unable to read, speak, and understand the English language, or has a disability 
and can prove it with a physician's certificate. Idaho Code Section 2-209(1). The jury 
commissioner can also excuse jurors because the prospective juror is not a citizen of the United 
States of America, is not at least 18 years old, is not a resident of the county, or has a felony 
criminal conviction. Idaho Code Section 2-209(2). Any prospective juror who is 70 or older can 
request to be excused. Idaho Code Section 2-212(2). A final way to get out of jury dutv ( or 
postponed, if you will) is for the prospective juror to make a showing of undue hardship, extreme 
inconvenience, public necessity, or be a breast-feeding mother. Idaho Code Section 2-212(3). 
Any person requesting a postponement shall provide a sworn statement setting forth the 
ground for the request and the anticipated date that the ground will no longer exist. Idaho Code 
Section 2-212(3)(a) (emphasis added). This statute was later amended in 2005. 
When a prospective juror actually makes it to court, they are sworn to tell the truth when 
answering questions to determine their qualifications to serve as a juror (Transcript, page 967). 
If they are finally chosen as a juror, they are sworn to try the case and render a just verdict 
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(Transcript, page 1097). Oaths are important in our judicial system. 
From the transcript we can discern some of the questions asked of some, but not all, of 
the jurors in the questionnaire. It is unclear from the existing record and transcript the reasons 
jurors were being pre-screened. It is clear they were answering questions from the court and the 
attorneys without being sworn. This is fundamental error and violates due process and the 
statute. This could not be corrected at a later time during the trial because the way that 84 
potential jurors made it to the actual voir dire and the way 44 potential jurors didn't make it to 
the actual jury selection process was due to questioning not under oath nor any kind of sworn 
statement. 
Questions were asked of potential jurors not solely for undue hardship in serving in a two 
to three week jury trial, as was believed to be the court's purpose (Transcript, page 587). The 
following topics also were discussed with jurors, all without the benefit of being sworn: 
psychology background (Transcript, page 601 ), 
domestic violence (Transcript, page 610, 905, 938), 
evidence (Transcript, 621,744,767,787,817,919), 
knowledge of victim (Transcript, page 630,638, 737,757,881,939), 
death of a husband (Transcript, page 636), 
knowledge of attorney (Transcript, page 673, 935), 
burden of proof (Transcript, page 682, 691, 724, 726, 740, 769, 9 l 0, 9 l 8)_ 
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punishment in a murder case (Transcript, page 716,746,906,922), 
news coverage (Transcript, page 732, 768, 848, 907, 940), 
constitutional law (Transcript, page 749), 
race (Transcript, page 751), 
role of police (Transcript, page 785), 
attitude (Transcript, page 832). 
The sole remedy for Parkinson caimot be to object at the time of the jury screening. 
Idaho Code Section 2-213(3). This jury screening was at the request of the court, not counsel. 
The statutory scheme does not address a jury screening process as was implemented in this case. 
Parkinson's rights to due process ai1d a fair trial under the Constitution of the United States, 
Amendment V, and the Constitution of the State of Idaho, Article I, Section 13, have to 
supersede ai1y statutory scheme which does not address the screening process. 
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III. THE STATE OF IDAHO'S FOOTPRINT EXPERT WAS NOT QUALIFIED TO 
TESTIFY AS AN EXPERT AND DID SO ANYWAY DUE TO THE PROSECUTOR'S 
QUESTIONS, AND SUCH VIOLATED THE PRETRIAL ORDER AND INVADED 
THE JURY'S PROVINCE. 
A Motion in Limine was filed by Parkinson asking the Court for its Order prohibiting the 
presentation of footprint evidence as "expert" testimony. (Record, page 260-262). The court 
held a hearing to determine if the testimony qualified as expert testimony. (Transcript, page 297-
360). The Court ruled that the State's footprint expert could testify as to generalities, but not say 
in essence that the footprint at the scene of the crime was Parkinson's footprint. (Transcript. 
page 510-514). Unfortunately, that's exactly what happened. The footprint expert testified to the 
jury upon questioning from the prosecuting attorney, as follows: 
Prosecutor: As a result of your research in this particular case, have you formed 
an opinion to a reasonable degree of forensic certainty? 
Witness: I've reached a conclusion, yes. 
Prosecutor: And as a result of that conclusion, what is it? 
Witness: I fotmd that the evidence was strong looking at the crime scene 
impression. So I found strong support to the proposition that the person 
who made the blood stained impression at the crime scene also made the 
impression on the roll of paper here in the courtroom. 
(Transcript, page 1719-1720). 
The judge had previously ordered that conclusions were not permitted because the 
evidence was not scientific. The testimony violated the pretrial order. The inadmissible 
testimony was again repeated by the prosecutor during closing argument. (Transcript, page 2244, 
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2256). 
This error is not harmless. The defense attorney should not be made to object in front of 
the jury when the pretrial order already prohibited the conclusion, as an objection from a defense 
attorney sometimes draws juror's attention toward the testimony, not away from it. This 
testimony was not from an expert, but the prosecutor was making him out to be one. The court 
wm1ted the jury to figure out if the footprints matched or d icin · l match. i he resr i 111011v vrolareu 
the court's order and invaded the jury's province. 
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IV. THE INFORMATION SHOULD HA VE BEEN DISMISSED DUE TO THE 
INFORMATION NOT CONTAINING ALL THE ELEMENTS OF A CRIME. 
The Prosecuting Attorney's Information was filed on March 12, 2004. The Information 
does not contain a date on which the crimes were alleged to happen. only the vear 2004 -- 110 
month, no date. For over 100 years, it's been known in ourjurisprudence that in every criminal 
offense the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt a crime happened on or about a certain 
date. State v. Steers, 12 Idaho 174 (1906); Idaho Code Section 19-1409. 
On May 18, 2005, the state called their last witness at the jury trial, Officer Aaron Smith. 
(Record, page 540). Officer Smith was the lead officer of the investigation and had sat at counsel 
table with the prosecutor throughout the trial. Officer Smith concluded his testimony after 
4:00pm on that day. In the presence of the jury, the following then occurred: 
Court: Would you like to call another witness, please? 
Prosecutor: Your Honor, we don't plan on calling any other - further witnesses, but if 
we could have tonight to check our exhibits to make sure that we've got 
everything entered, but we planned on resting at this point. 
Court: Okay. We'll allow you some time to work with the clerks and the marshal 
to make sure all of your exhibits are here and properly admitted and that 
sort of thing, but we'll consider that the end of your witnesses for the 
State's case in chief, understanding you may present rebuttal. 
Prosecutor: Yes, Your Honor, that is correct. 
Court: Okay, ladies and gentlemen of the jury it's about 20 minutes to 5. f think 
it's probably a little late for the defense to start on its witnesses so l think 
we'll recess a few minutes early, give the state an opportunity to iook at its 
exhibits. Come back tomorrow morning, begin at IO o'clock. Court's in 
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recess. 
(Transcript, page 1996). (Emphasis added). 
The following morning, on May 19, 2005, the attorneys told the judge they needed to read 
a stipulation into the record concerning some exhibits. (Transcript, page 1997). The defense 
attorney then made a motion for judgment of acquittal on the basis that there was not a date in the 
information. The prosecutor argued he had met each and every element of the offense and still 
did not realize the fatal error of the Information. (Transcript, page 1998). So the judge assisted 
the prosecutor in overcoming the fatal error to his case, as follows: 
Court: You may wish to move to amend your Information. The dates are not 
included. 
Prosecutor: In the original charging? 
Court: On the Prosecuting Attorney's Information. which was dated March 12 .. 
2004, filed March 12, 2004, there are no dates. 
Prosecutor: Okay, we would move to amend the Information to include the date of 
February 1, 2004, on the Burglary and the various counts contained in the 
Information. 
Court: Mr. Crowley? 
Defense: Your Honor, I would object. The state's rested their case. 
Prosecutor: Your Honor, we indicated we would rest our case this morning after 
checking with the various exhibits and/or pleadings. 
Court: I believe Mr. Dunn is correct. ... I may have that wrong .. Mr. Dunn, help 
me with the rule ... 
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Court: Now it's an interesting situation we found ourselves in. You moved 
before he rested. I guess I probably should have clarified that, but having 
done so-
Defense: And I understood he had rested, so ... 
Prosecutor: I never said that on the record ... 
(Transcript, page 1999-2002). 
This exchange is absolutely terrible. The judge who wears the black robe is not an 
assistant prosecuting attorney. He's a judge. He's not supposed to help out the prosecutor, 
especially with so much at stake. He is to be fair to both sides. The prosecuting attorney rested 
his case the night before - the judge merely allowed the opportunity to review his exhibits, not 
call any witnesses as he did so. Specifically, the court ruled, the night before, that the 
prosecuting attorney could only call rebuttal witnesses. To have the judge handicap the defense 
after the defense has shown a fnndamental flaw in the prosecutor's case and to reverse his ruling 
and advise the prosecutor how to correct the error in the charge is in direct contravention to the 
traditional and accepted roles of judge, prosecuting attorney, and defense attorney. This directly 
resulted in the conviction of the defendant. This violated the rules established to protect and 
preserve defendant's constitutional rights. 
It is a fnndamental error which does not call for a retrial of the case but an outright 
dismissal of the charges as the charging document was defective. The prosecuting attorney, after 
resting his case, did not prove each and every element of the offense as required by the law. 
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If this appeals court rules that it's the defense attorney's "own damn fault" for letting the 
prosecuting attorney know of the fatal error before the state rested, then a secondary appeal 
against the defense attorney for ineffective assistance of counsel is forthcoming. It is unknown 
how any court could rule that Parkinson received effective assistance of counsel if this court rules 
that the defense attorney "jumped the gun." 
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V. THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY PRESENTED IMPROPER ARGUMENTS TO 
THE JURY. 
Our case law in Idaho is replete with bad prosecutor conduct from Coeur d'Alene. 
Although the prosecuting attorney in this case was not from Coeur d'Alene, he nonetheless 
presented improper arguments to the jury. The prosecutor improperly appealed to the .i uror· s 
sympathy and emotions and improperly emphasized inadmissible evidence. by mguing as 
follows: 
I'm also extremely humbled to be able to represent the victims' family, and I hope 
that anything I've said or done in the last few weeks would not disturb the 
memory of Gregg Whitmore or Karen Cummings. 
(Transcript, page 223 7). 
And here is the footprint to the kitchen and out towards the garage door. And, of 
course, we talked extensively about these footprints, as you know, and why they 
were the defendant's footprints .... And we wanted to show you this for the 
presentation of Mr. Kennedy of the Royal Canadian Mounties so you can see what 
he did in his analysis. 
(Transcript, page 2243, 2244). 
Sergeant Robert Kem1edy, he was brought to show you the comparisons of the 
footprints and why they matched. And just in lay language. I'd like to explain 
what he talked about. He took the known footprint and then put il on all of the 
unknowns. And then he took all of the unknowns and put it back on the knowns 
for both the right and the left foot to show they matched and the defendant's 
known footprints matched her footprint at the crime scene. 
(Transcript, page 2256). 
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These argumeuts are improper under the recently decided case of State v. Phillips, 2007 
Idaho (31872) (App. March 9, 2007). Prosecutors may not appeal to emotion, passion or 
prejudice nor argue as substantive evidence matters admitted for limited evidentiary purposes. 
The Phillips court quoted State oflrwin, 9 ldaho 35 (1903), for the long-standing 
proposition that: 
It is the duty of the prosecutor to see that a defendant has a fair trial, and that 
nothing but competent evidence is submitted to the jury, and above all things he 
should guard against anything that would prejudice the minds of the jurors, and 
tend to hinder them from considering only the evidence introduced. 
9 Idaho at 44. 
When the prosecutor argued he represented the victims, that argument was a misstatement 
of law. Prosecutors don't represent victims. When the prosecutor argued the inadmissible 
conclusions of their footprint expert, that argument was bolstering inadmissible evidence. The 
arguments were improper. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Prosecuting Attorney's Information against Parkinson should have been dismissed 
due to each and every element of the alleged crimes not being proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Information is not dismissed, Parkinson shonld be 
granted a new trial. 
Dated: June 'Z q , 2007. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 certify that I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho, that I have my 
office in Idaho Falls, ldaho, and that on this day I served a true and correct copy of U1e foregoing 
document on the following by the method of delivery indicated: 
Lawrence G. Wasden, Esq. 
,Statehouse, Room 210 
P.O. Box. 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
COURTESY COPY 
Dated: June -iq , 2007. 
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